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I. INTRODUCTION 
Structured finance, although only a recent innovation, none-
theless is "becoming one of the dominant means of capital for-
mation in the United States."l Also known as asset securitiza-
tion, structured finance refers to an approach used to raise 
capital 
whereby income-producing [financial] assets . . . are pooled and 
converted into capital market instruments. In a typical [struc-
tured] financing, a sponsor transfers a pool of [financial] assets to 
a limited purpose entity, which in turn issues [in the capital 
markets] non-redeemable debt obligations or equity securities 
with debt-like characteristics ... Payment on the securities de-
pends primarily on the cash flows generated by the pooled as-
sets.2 
Structured finance offers a company important advantages 
over other approaches to raising capital. Transactions are ar-
ranged so that investors make their investment decisions by 
focusing on the quality of specific financial assets3 of a compa-
nyinstead of looking to the company's overall financial 
strength. Thus, businesses that could not easily raise funds 
through traditional sources may be able to use securitization to 
1 Investment Company Act Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided in connection 
with the recent issuance of Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act or 
1940) [hereinafter SEC Release]. 
2 Id. For an introduction to the principles underlying structured finance and 
asset securitization, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF AssET SECURITIZATION (Practicing- Law Institute, 2d ed. 
1993). 
For an example of a large but fairly typical structured finance transaction, 
see the discussion of the recent Sears credit card securitization in Asset Sales 
Report, Feb. 8, 1993, at 1. Sears, Roebuck & Co. sold its credit card accounts 
receivable (that is, Sears' right to payment from customers who charged their 
purchases on a Sears' credit card) to a newly created master trust, which in 
tum sold interests in these receivables to several newly·created limited purpose 
corporations. The limited purpose corporations funded their purchase of the 
interests by issuing up to $1.5 billion in commercial paper to investors in the 
capital markets. 
3 "Financial assets" are assets that by their terms are expected to convert 
into cash within a finite period of time. Examples of financial assets include 
leases, loans, mortgages, and trade accounts receivable. 
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gain access to the capital markets.4 Companies that already 
could raise funds through traditional sources may be able to 
use securitization to obtain funding on more advantageous 
terms through lower interest rates5 or off-balance sheet struc-
tures.6 
Structured finance is expected to continue to grow in impor-
tance as a source of capital for companies.7 There is, however, 
a practical limitation to structured finance. Companies below 
investment grade,S and even investment grade companies en-
gaged in publicly marketed transactions, must structure their 
securitization transactions in a manner that protects investors 
in the event of a subsequent bankruptcy. Perhaps the most 
essential element of such a "bankruptcy-remote" structure is a 
4 The capital markets are "markets where capital funds - debt and equity 
- are traded. Included are private placement sources of debt and equity as well 
as organized markets and exchanges." JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN GoODMAN, 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INvEsTMENT TERMS 54 (3d ed. 1991). 
5 Debt securities issued in the capital markets typically bear a lower inter-
est rate than a bank financing. This is due partly to ratings by rating agencies, 
see infra note 8, partly to the source of funds being a mix of institutional and 
other investors, and partly to the ability of an investor in the capital markets 
to freely trade the debt securities. Debt securities issued pursuant to a struc-
tured finance transaction further benefit from the source of payment being 
separated from possible credit risks associated with the company. 
6 An off-balance sheet structure refers to a company raising financing by 
selling assets to a third party, which in turn issues debt securities in the 
capital markets. Thus, the company's balance sheet will reflect an asset sale 
and not the issuance of debt. Accordingly, the company's leverage (ratio of debt 
to equity) will not be affected. 
7 See, e.g., You Can Securitize Virtually Everything, Bus. WK., July 20, 
1992, at 78. The SEC also recently adopted Rule 3a-7 under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 to relax an inadvertent restriction on the growth of these 
transactions: "Rule 3a-7 [adopted by the SEC under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940] removes an unnecessary and unintended barrier to the use of 
structured financings in all sectors of the economy •.•• " SEC Release, supra 
note 1, at 83,499. 
6 The term "investment grade" technically refers to the rating on a compa-
ny's long-term debt securities given by independent rating agencies. An invest-
ment grade rating reflects a rating agency's prediction that the debt securities 
will be paid on a timely basis. At the end of 1992, most medium-sized, or 
"middle-market," companies either did not have ratings or were not rated 
investment grade. At that time, even some larger companies, including virtually 
all airlines and department stores, did not have investment grade ratings. See, 
e.g., S.& P. Lowers Bond Ratings of the 3 Big Airlines to Junk, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Mar. 12, 1993, at Dl. 
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"true sale" of financial assets from the company to the limited 
purpose entity.9 Structuring an economically viable. transaction 
as a true sale, however, has not always seemed feasible. For 
this reason, structured financing has not expanded in any mea-
ningful way to the significant middle-market. 
This article introduces the concept of a "divisible interest," a 
type of partial interest in financial assets, and explains how 
this innovation can expand the structured finance market sig-
nificantly while maintaining the true sale nature so critical in 
structured financing. The divisible interest approach also can be 
applied to pool financial assets from multiple companies into a 
single securitization transaction, thereby catalyzing an expan-
sion of the capital markets to now-excluded middle-market com-
panies. 
This article will first discuss the legal basis underlying struc-
tured finance, focusing on the importance of a "true sale" and 
its determining criteria. The article will then introduce the 
"divisible interest" concept and apply the true sale criteria to 
divisible interests. In that analysis, the article will dispel the 
unfounded perception that the transfer of only a partial interest 
in a future payment stream cannot be a true sale for bankrupt-
cy purposes. The article then analyzes the commercial applica-
,bility of a divisible interest in structuring a securitization 
transaction. Finally, the article examines Section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code1o and Section 9-306 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and concludes that their cash collateral provisions are 
not applicable to divisible interests. 
To help the reader focus more concretely on the issues, this 
article will use the example of a "future payment stream" as a 
representative type of financial asset. Nonetheless, the conclu-
sions reached will have general applicability to all types of fi-
nancial assets.ll 
9 See infra notes 12 to 18 and accompanying text. A "true sale" is one 
w~ich will prevent the property being sold from becoming part of the seller's 
bankruptcy estate in a bankruptcy subsequent to the sale. 
10 11 U.S.C. § 363 [hereinafter 11 U.S.C. et seq. may be referred to as the 
"Bankruptcy Code"]. 
11 To the extent the future payment stream in which an interest is being 
sold is a general intangible under the U.C.C., it raises issues of general applica-
tion that are beyond the scope of this article. Such issues include how to perfect 
the sale, and whether the filing of U.C.C.-l financing statements is sufficient in 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A Importance of a True Sale 
Before discussing the legal and economic consequences of 
selling a divisible interest in a future payment stream, it is 
necessary to explain the meaning of a "true sale." In many 
structured financing transactions, a future payment stream is 
legally separated from the company originating a right to ·re-
ceive payment for goods or services (known as the "originator"). 
That way, if the originator later becomes bankrupt, creditors of 
the originator are unable to reach the future payment stream. 
The future payment stream, in turn, is dedicated to payment of 
the securities issued to investors in the capital markets. 
To effect a sale of a future payment stream, the originator 
normally transfers all its right, title, and interest in the future 
payment stream to a' bankruptcy-remote third party. This 
transfer should fully separate the future payment stream from 
the originator entity. Sales that are effective against creditors 
and the estate of a bankrupt originator, in that the property is 
no longer "property of the debtor's estate" under Section 541 of 
the Bankruptcy Code,12 are generally referred to as "true 
sales.,,13 For originators that are below investment grade, or 
that do not have investment grade ratings (which include most 
middle-market companies, as well as hospitals),14 it is critical 
light of U.C.C. § 9-102 and Official Comment No.2; whether contractual prohi-
bitions on the sale of future payment streams are valid under U.C.C. § 9-318 
and Official Comment No.4; and the issues relating to the sale of future intan-
gibles described in note 36, infra. But see Permanent Editorial Study Board 
Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Report Vol. I, part IIl.A.1, at 
43 (Dec. 1, 1992) which recommended that "Articie 9 [of the U.C.C.] should be 
revised to include within its scope sales of general intangibles for the payment 
of money." Other issues of general application to the sale of a future payment 
stream, such as tax treatment, also are beyond the" scope of this article. 
12 11 U.S.C. § 541 (property of a debtor's estate). For a sale to be effective 
against creditors as well, the sale must not constitute a fraudulent conveyance 
under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or applicable state fraudulent transfer 
laws. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 35-36. 
13 The term "true sale" will have a different definition depending on the 
field of law for which it is operative. The three principal areas of applicability 
are accounting, tax, and bankruptcy. A given transfer of receivables may well 
be a sale for certain purposes but not others. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 
28-29. 
14 Because investment grade companies are regarded by the rating agencies 
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to the success of a structUred financing transaction that the 
transfer of the relevant future payment stream to the third 
party constitutes a true sale. III 
The third party to whom the future payment stream is sold 
would be a bankruptcy-remote, limited purpose entity (referred 
to as a special purpose vehicle or SPVI6). The SPV raises 
funds to pay the purchase price for the future payment stream 
to the originator by issuing debt securities (or securities having 
debt-like characteristics) to investors in the capital markets. 
Since these securities usually are rated as investment grade ()r 
higher by nationally recognized rating agencies because of the 
quality of the underlying financial assets, they can be traded in 
the capital markets.17 Their ability to be tTaded not only at-
tracts investors but also means that the mix of investors in a 
given structured finance transaction may well change during 
the life of the transaction. 
as highly unlikely to go bankrupt, it is sometimes less critical in structuring a 
securitization transaction to protect against the possibility of bankruptcy. 
15 If the transfer of the future payment stream from the originator to the 
third party fails to constitute a true sale under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
the transfer would be deemed an advance of funds by the third party to the 
originator secured by the payment stream, i.e., a secured loan. The third party 
would then be a creditor of the originator and have a security interest, but not 
an ownership interest, in the payment stream. In such a case, the originator's 
bankruptcy would, under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, automatically result in 
a stay of all actions by creditors to foreclose on or otherwise obtain property of 
the originator. The third party may not be able to obtain payments collected on 
the payment stream until the stay is modified. Further, under § 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, a court, after notice to creditors and the opportunity of a 
hearing, could order the cash collections of the payment stream to be used by 
the originator in its business as working capital if the originator or its trustee 
in bankruptcy provides adequate protection for the interest of the third party in 
the payment stream. "Adequate protection," though, does not always translate 
into an alternative cash source. 
In addition, § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code also would permit the originator, 
if credit is not otherwise available to it and if adequate protection is given to 
the third party, to raise cash by granting to new lenders a lien that is either 
pari passu with that of the third party or, if a pari passu lien cannot attract 
new financing, a lien having priority over the third party's lien. See SCHWARCZ, 
supra note 2, at 30. 
18 Special purpo,se vehicles can be structured in many forms such as corpo-
rations, trusts, or partnerships. For a more complete discussion of the types of 
SWs, the reasons for each type, and the importance of making the SPV "bank-
ruptcy remote," see SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 16-27. 
17 Such securities are known as "asset-backed securities." 
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Whether the transfer of a future payment stream constitutes 
a true sale under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code requires 
case-by-case analysis. IS Although various courts have consid-
ered whether transfers of payment streams constitute a true 
sale for bankruptcy purposes, the facts of the decided cases 
have not been representative for the most part of modern struc-
tured finance transactions. Accordingly, the cases are not easily 
harmonized, and readers can differ as to which factors are rele-
vant and which are entitled to greater weight. Nonetheless, a 
cluster of factors can be identified that are relevant in most 
determinations of whether a given transfer of payment streams 
is a sale or a secured loan. Each of these factors is indicative of 
whether the originator truly parted with the future economic 
risks and benefits of ownership of the payment stream purport-
ed to be sold, and whether the purported buyer has taken on 
the risks and benefits of ownership. 
1. Recourse 
The most significant factor in determining whether a trans-
action is a true sale or a secured loan appears to be the extent 
and nature of the recourse that the transferee of the payment 
stream has against the transferor.19 The existence of some re-
course in a sale agreement does not by itself preclude charac-
terization of the transaction as a true sale.20 If recourse is 
present, the issue is "whether the nature of the recourse, and 
the true nature of the transaction, are such that the legal 
rights and economic consequences of the agreement bear a 
greater similarity to a financing transaction [a secured loan] or 
to a sale. "21 
I 
18 Portions of the following discussion of true sale criteria have been based 
on SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 31-35, with permission of the author and pub-
lisher. 
19 See, e.g., Majors Furniture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 
545 n.12 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that Grant Gilmore "placers] almost controlling 
significance on the one factor of recourse"); see also 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURI- . 
TY INTERESTS IN PERsONAL PROPERTY § 44.4, at 1230 (1965). 
20 Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 544 (relying on U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 
4); see also PETER F. COOGAN ET AL., 1C SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 28.03[4] (1992). 
21 Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 544 (footnote omitted). 
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In the leading case of Major's Furniture Mart v. Castle Cred-
it Corp., 22 the court analyzed the recourse provisions in an ac-
counts receivable financing agreement to determine whether the 
transaction should be considered a sale or a secured loan. In 
holding the transaction to be a secured loan, the court consid-
ered the risks that each party- assumed as well as the guaran-
ties given by Major's as to the quality and the collectibility of 
its accounts.23 Major's was required to give the following war-
ranties: that its customers "meet the criteria set forth by Cas-
tle, that Major's perform the credit check to verify that these 
criteria were satisfied, and that Major's warrant that the ac-
counts were fully enforceable legally and were 'fully and timely 
collectible. ,"24 Major's was also required to indemnify Castle for 
any losses that resulted from "a customer's failure to pay, or for 
any breach of warranty, and an obligation to repurchase any 
account after the customer was in default for more than 60 
days."25 The court concluded that "[g]uaranties of quality 
alone, or even guarantees of collectibility alone, might be con-
sistent with a true sale, but Castle attempted to shift; all risks 
to Major's, and incur none of the risks or obligations of owner-
ship. "28 This case is illustrative of the approach courts take in 
determining the nature of the recourse in a particular transac-
tic:m.27 
2. Retained Rights and Right to Surplus 
Perhaps the second most important factor indicating the exis-
tence of a secured transaction rather than a sale is the origina-
tor's right to redeem or repurchase a transferred payment 
stream. For example, Section 9-506 of the Uniform Commercial 
22 449 F. Supp. 538 (E.n.p.A. 1978), affd, 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979), 
23 Id. at 543. 
24Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. To the extent that the seller of a payment stream makes representa-
tions and warranties that are not continuing representations and warranties of 
collectibility, but rather ones limited to the condition and characteristics of the 
payment streams at the time they are sold, such warranties should be no 
different than warranties ordinarily given by a seller of a product. See U.C.C. 
§§ 2-312 to 2-315. Accordingly, such limited representations and warranties 
should not be inconsistent with treatment of the transaction as a sale. 
27 See, e.g., In re Joseph Kanner Hat Co., 482 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1973). 
No. 2:139] SECURITIZATION OF DNISIBLE INTERESTS 147 
Code and various state mortgage statutes allow a debtor to 
redeem property before a secured party ultimately disposes of 
it.28 The absence of a right of redemption or repurchase would 
be a factor in favor of characterization of the structured finance 
transaction as a true sale. 
Several courts also have considered the existence of a trans-
feror's right to any surplus collections, once the transferee has 
collected its investment plus an agreed yield, as indicative of a 
secured' loan.29 The right of the SPV to retain collections for 
its own account, even after the SPV has collected its invest-
ment plus yield, therefore would be a factor in favor of charac-
terization of the structured finance transaction as a true sale. 
3. Pricing Mechanism 
Pricing based upon a fluctuating interest index of the type 
found in commercial loan 'agreements, such as the prime or 
base rate, may be indicative of a secured loan. The pricing mec-
hanism also may be indicative of a secured loan to the extent 
the purchase price is retroactively adjusted to reflect actual 
rather than expected collections on payment streams.30 
In the closest approach to a true sale, the SPV would pur-
chase a future payment stream on a discounted basis. The dis-
count would be calculated or negotiated prior to each purchase, 
in part based on the SPV's then net current cost of funds and 
the anticipated collection and loss experience of the payment 
stream then to be purchased. Once a discount has been negoti-
ated for each purchase, it could not thereafter be adjusted for 
that purchase, regardless of differences between the actual and 
anticipated costs of funds and of collection experience. Such 
fixed pricing would be a factor in favor of characterization of 
the structured finance transaction as a true sale. 
28 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-506 (Supp. 1992). 
29 See, e.g., In re Nixon Mach. Co., 6 B.R. 847, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
1980); Evergrelln Valley Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659, 661-62 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); 
In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp., 19 B.R. 609, 617 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982), 
relJ'd on other grounds, 763 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1985). 
30 See Home Bond Co. v. McChesney, 239 U.S. 568 (1916); Dorothy v. 
Commonwealth Commercial Co., 116 N.E. 143 (lll. 1917). 
148 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1993 
4. Administration and Collection of Accounts 
The administration of and control over the collection of the 
payment stream are factors courts sometime cite in resolving 
the sale/secured loan issue.31 In the strongest example of a 
true . sale of a payment stream, the SPY should have the au-
thority to control collection of the payments.32 Examples of 
such authority would' include: (1) the SPV's ownership of all 
books, records, and computer tapes relating to the payment 
stream, and (2) the SPV's having the right (a) to control the 
activities of the collection agent for the payment stream and at 
any time to appoint another collection agent, (b) to establish a 
credit and collection policy for the payment stream, and (c) at 
any time to notify the persons obligated to make the payments 
that the payment stream has been sold. 
In practice, the originator often is ~ppointed as the collection 
agent. That is not necessarily inconsistent with characterization 
as a sale if: (1) the originator will be acting as an agent for the 
SPY pursuant to established standards, much like any other 
collection agent; (2) the originator will receive a collection agent 
fee that represents an arm's-length fee for those services; and 
(3) the SPY has the right at any time to appoint itself or an-
other person as collection agent in place of the originator.33 
Sometimes collections of the payment stream are paid to the 
originator as collection agent and commingled, or mixed, with 
the originator's general funds. This frequently occurs when the 
originator receives collections from the payment stream each 
day, but remits the collections periodically (e.g., monthly) to the 
SPY. Besides raising a potential perfection question under the 
UCC,34 commingling might raise a question whether a sale 
was intended if the originator is permitted to use collections 
that belong to the SPY. That inconsistency often can be addres-
sed by the originator's segregating and holding the collections 
in trust pending remittance to the SPY or periodic reinvestment. 
31 One interesting discussion of this question occurs in the British case, 
Lloyds & Scottish Fin. Ltd. v. Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd., House of Lords, 29 
Mar. 1979 (LEXIS, English General Library, Cases File). 
32 People v. Service Inst., Inc., 421 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). 
33 See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 34. 
34 See discussion infra part II.C. 
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There are also a variety of miscellaneous factors that do not 
fall within the categories discussed above, but that may be 
indicative of a secured loan.35 
B. Applying the True Sale Criteria to Divisible Interests 
In order to apply the foregoing true sale criteria to the sale 
of a divisible interest in a future payment stream, it is neces-
sary to define a "divisible interest." A divisible interest is any 
interest in a future payment stream that (1) is less than all of 
the originator's right, title, and interest in the payment stream 
and (2) can be measured. clearly so that the originator and the 
SPV will have no valid basis to dispute how collections (once 
received) are to be divided. References to the sale of a divisible 
interest in a future payment stream are intended to mean the 
sale of a divisible interest in an existing right to future pay-
ment as well as the sale of a divisible interest in collections. It 
is important to sell the right to an intangible asset and not 
only the proceeds of such asset once such proceeds are later 
collected.3s 
35 These factors are: (1) the originator of the payment stream is a debtor of 
the SPV on or before the purchase date; (2) the SPV's rights in the payment 
stream can be extinguished by payments or repurchases by the originator or by 
payments from sources other than collections on the payment stream; (3) the 
originator is obligated to pay the SPV's costs (including attorney fees) incurred 
in collecting delinquent or uncollectible payments; (4) the language of the docu-
mentation contains references to the transfer being "security for" a debt; and (5) 
the parties' intent, as evidenced by the documentation and their actions, sug-
gests that the parties view the transaction as a security device. Also of impor-
tance is how the parties account for the transactions on their books, records, 
and tax returns. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
35 There are two reasons why it may not be feasible to sell an interest in 
future payments under a contract not yet in existence. First, the common law 
governing the sale of intangibles is ambiguous as to the effectiveness of the sale 
of an intangible asset that does not exist on the date of its purported sale. 
Compare New York Security and Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas and Electric Co., 53 
N.E. 758 (N.Y. 1899) (purchaser of accounts must ensure that the subject 
matter of accounts involves a right existing at the time of assignment in order 
to protect its interest from general creditors) with Rockmore v. Lehman, 128 
F.2d 564 (2d Cir.) rev'd on reh'g, 129 F.2d 892, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1942) 
(assignment of account which arose from contract already in existence was a 
legal assignment with priority over prior or subsequent equitable claims and 
over subsequent lien creditors in a court of law). Second, under § 552 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, assets that are acquired by a debtor after a bankruptcy 
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The particular example of a divisible interest discussed in 
this article is an interest in the future payment stream equal 
to 100 percent of collections up to a" negotiated amount (the 
"trigger point") and a fixed percentage (the "fixed percentage") 
of collections above the trigger point. This is not necessarily the 
only way a divisible interest can be structured, but merely the 
author's suggestion of a potentially useful structure. 
There has been an unfounded perception that the transfer of 
only a partial interest in a future payment stream (as opposed 
to transfer of the entire payment stream) cannot be a true sale 
for bankruptcy purposes. Part of the confusion may be seman-
tic. The transfer of au of a person's right, title, and interest in 
an asset to another person is the very defmition of a sale of 
such asset.37 Yet a divisible interest has been defined as less 
than all of the originator's right, title and interest in the rele-
vant payment stream I This apparent dilemma is resolved by 
recognizing that what is being sold is all of the originator's 
right, title, and interest in a divisible interest in the payment 
stream, as opposed to all of the originator's right, title, and 
interest in the entire payment stream. 
At least one court has held that the assignment of a partial 
interest in a future payment transfers full legal title in that 
interest to the assignee. In Angeles Real Estate Co. v. Kerx-
ton,38 one-half of the proceeds of a note was assigned by a 
construction company as payment for a prior debt.39 When the 
construction company was adjudicated bankrupt, the assignee 
sued the trustee of the bankruptcy estate for one-half of the 
petition is flIed may not be subject to a pre-bankruptcy security interest except 
to the extent that such assets are proceeds of property pledged prior to bank-
ruptcy. 
It would be feasible to sell an interest (divisible or otherwise) in the right to 
future payments arising from existing trade accounts receivable or even consist-
ing of the right to payments that are expected to come due in the future under 
an existing contract (indeed, there is authority that one may assign a future 
right to payment under an existing contract even if services giving rise to the 
payment obligation under such contract have not yet been p"erformed) United 
Va. Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co. (In re Slab Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188 (4th. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986); See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 9 n.9 & 
37-39; cf. U.C.C. § 9-204 (security interests in after-acquired property). 
37 See supra text accompanying note 13. ' 
38 737 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1984). 
39 Id. at 418. 
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proceeds that had been collected on the note. The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the assignee had a superior claim to half of the 
proceeds since the partial assignment transferred legal title to 
the assignee. In rejecting the trustee's contention that "a partial 
assignment does not create a legal interest in the assignee un-
less the debtor [i.e., the person obligated to make the payment] 
consents to the assignment," the court reasoned first, that 
"[h]ere there is no question of prejudicing the obligor on the 
note," and second, that Section 326 of the Restatement Second 
of Contracts provides that an "'assignment of a part of a right 
[, whether the part is specified as a fraction, as an amount, or 
otherwise,] is operative as to that part to the same extent and 
in the same manner as if the part had been a separate 
right.'n40 Under the logic of the Angeles Real Estate Co. case, 
an originator's sale of a divisible interest in a future payment 
stream will effectively separate that interest from the originator 
entity in the event of a subsequent bankruptcy.41 
40 Id. at 419 (quoting Restatement Second of Contracts § 326(1) (1981); 
bracketed language appears in § 326(1) but was omitted from the quotation 
cited by the court). 
41 The law arising from the sale of loan participations is also instructive. A 
loan participation is an undivided interest in a loan. The bank that made the 
loan sells the participation to another bank, thereby diversifying the lending 
bank's credit risk. See, e.g., Reade H. Ryan, Jr., Participations in Loans under 
New York Law, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Oct. 1984 at 40. 
In the leading case on the characterization of a loan participation as a true 
sale, FDIC v. Mademoiselle of California, 379 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1967), San 
Francisco National Bank ("SFNB") sold to Union Bank an 80% interest in a 
loan. SFNB subsequently was declared insolvent and taken over by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver. After SFNB's takeover, SFNB 
received a substantial payment on its loan through a set-off. Union Bank as-
serted a preferred claim to 80% of that payment. 379 F.2d at 664. The court 
would have given Union Bank a preferred claim, as opposed to merely a distri-
bution of SFNB's assets pro rata with other creditors, if "the property is not 
that of [SFNB] but that of the claimant [Union Bank]." 379 F.2d at 664. 
The court acknowledged the general rule that "[a]n assignment of payments 
to be made in futuro ..• is held to pass legal title in the proceeds to the as-
signee." 379 F.2d at 665. The court further stated that "[i]f Mademoiselle [the 
borrower] had made a specific payment on the note in the amount now claimed 
by Union [Bank], this case would come within [the foregoing] rule," thereby 
recognizing that the sale of an undivided interest in a loan can constitute a 
true sale. Ido Nonetheless, the court held that Union Bank did not have a 
preferred claim based on the narrow (and this author believes, archaic) ground 
that the payment occurred through a set-off and a set-off does not aUgIl).ent the 
assets of SFNB or its receiver. Id. Mademoiselle nevertheless establishes the 
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1. Commercial Application 
Selling a divisible interest in a future payment stream can 
have significant commercial importance. The right to receive 
future payments from obligors is an intangible that may not be 
easily divisible until cash collections actually are received. 
Therefore, the ability to sell a divisible interest, prior to collec-
tions being received, would afford significant flexibility to origi-
nators. This is evident, by way of example, where the future 
payment stream is due from a limited number of obligors, such 
as lessees on a few long-term leases. Even where the future 
payment stream is due from a large number of obligors, such 
rule that a participation can create a true sale. See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Group Inc., 113 B.R. 830, 842 n.15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("In Ma· 
de1TUJiselle, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged with approbation the general rule 
that a loan participation passes legal title in the proceeds of the fund to the 
participant.") 
The Made1TUJiselle case can be contrasted with another leading case on the 
sale of loan participations, In re Yale Express System, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 790 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). First National City Bank ("FNCB") made a loan to Yale Ex-
press, and then sold a 40% participation in that loan to Marine Midland Trust 
Company of New York ("Marine"). Yale Express subsequently went bankrupt. 
The issue before the court was whether Marine was a creditor of Yale Express 
and therefore could have set off against a bank account of Yale Express. IT the 
sale of the participation made Marine an owner of 40% of the loan, the set-off 
would have been permitted. 
The court ruled, however, that "Marine was not and is not a creditor entitled 
to set off the bank account." 245 F. Supp. at 792. Although the court does not 
discuss its reasoning, it is apparent from the facts specifically noted by the 
court that the true sale determination was based on the type of general factors 
discussed in part II.A of this article and not on the undivided' nature of the 
participation per se: 
[Marine's] right to repayment would arise only upon the receipt by FNCB 
of payment from Yale [Express]. All rights to extend or amend the Bub-
stantial terms of the credit agreement were lodged solely with FNCB. 
Upon any default by Yale, FNCB alone had the power to act respecting 
such default or defaults. In addition, FNCB had the option to repurchase 
Marine's stipulated participation interest. 
245 F. Supp. at 792. 
IT the participation agreement in the Yale Express case did not give FNCB 
the option to repurchase Marine's interest, if it did not provide that Marine's 
right to repayment would arise only upon FNCB's receipt of payment from Yale 
Express, and if Marine had some degree of control over amendments. to and 
enforcement of remedies under the credit agreement, this writer believes the 
court would have held the participation to be a true sale and therefore permit-
ted the set-off. 
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as buyers of goods who are obligated to pay trade receivables, 
an originator's ability to sell a divisible interest still would 
afford significant flexibility over more traditional pooling. The 
originator may have operational difficulties, for example, in 
segregating smaller pools of receivables and tracing proceeds of 
their collections. Selling a divisible interest can obviate the 
originator's need to do that and a host of similar problems. 
Selling a divisible interest also can provide a simplified and 
less cumbersome transactional structure. At present, many mid-
dle-market companies, because they lack an investment grade 
rating, cannot gain direct access to the capital markets. In or-
der to gain access to the capital markets through securitization, 
these companies presently would have to engage in a somewhat 
cumbersome structure, involving a true sale to a newly created 
bankruptcy-remote subsidiary and a second sale transaction 
between the subsidiary and an SPY that would issue securities 
in the capital markets.42 The costs involved in creating a two-
step structure prevent it, however, from being economically 
viable for the relatively small level of future payment streams 
originated by a typical middle-market company. 
Although it would be desirable to avoid the need for a two-
step structure, an economically viable true sale from the origi-
nator to the SPY is difficult to achieve. There is a tension be-
tween the originator - which wants to maximize the purchase 
price it receives for selling the future payment stream - and 
the SPY - which wants to minimize the purchase price. The 
excess of the amount of the future payment stream over the 
purchase price is referred to as "over-collateralization." The 
higher the over-collateralization, the more the SPY (and inves-
tors in its securities) are protected from losses but the less 
attractive the transaction is to the originator.43 A two-step 
~2 This structure is known as a "FINCO" or "two-tier" structure. The future 
payment stream is partly sold and partly transferred as a capital contribution 
to a newly created, bankruptcy-remote subsidiary of the originator. When the 
capital market securities eventually are paid, the originator regains the benefit 
of any excess collections remaining in the subsidiary by causing the subsidiary 
to dividend the excess to the originator or by merging the subsidiary into the 
originator. For a general discussion of the FINCO structure, see sCHW~Z, 
supra note 2, at 21-22. 
~3 Consider, for example, a true sale of a one million dollar future payment 
stream to an SPV. The originator would want to be paid one million dollars 
upon the sale of the future payment stream, discounted only for the SPV's cost 
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structure (see supra note 42) could· permit the originator to 
regain the benefit of excess collections, but it is a cumbersome 
and expensive solution. 
By selling a divisible interest in a future payment stream, 
however, t~e two-step structure is rendered unnecessary. As 
will be shown in an example below, the amount paid by an 
Spy to purchase a divisible interest would equal only a portion 
of the future payment stream. The divisible interest is struc-
tured, however, so the SPY will receive all collections of the 
payment stream up to the trigger point (and perhaps a fixed 
percentage of collections thereafter). The practical effect is that 
the SPY (and its investors) will have a high degree of protec~ 
tion from loss while the originator retains all or most of the 
benefit of collections above the trigger point. 
Perhaps of even greater commercial importance is the poten-
tial for multiple companies to sell divisible interests in their 
future payment streams as part of a single securitization trans-
action. At present, the level of future payment streams generat-
ed by a single middle-market company rarely would be suffi~ 
cient to justify the underwriting and related costs in selling an 
SPV's securities to investors in the capital markets. A possible 
solution would be to pool multiple originators in a single fi-
nancing, and thereby achieve an economy of scale. Present "true 
sale" structures, however, do not easily accommodate them-
selves to the pooling of multiple originators. In the two-tier 
structure, for example, the originator sells the future payment 
stream to a wholly owned, bankruptcy-remote SPY. If there are 
niultiple originators, each originator would have to own shares 
or other interests in the SPY and agree how the SPV's assets 
and income are to be divided. 
By using the concept of a divisible interest, however, multi-
ple originators could join together to sell their future payment 
streams to a single SPY, which would issue securities to inves-
of funds until the future payments are expected to be collected, suggesting, say, 
980,000 dollars as a purchase price. The SPV, however, also would want to 
guard against possible losses (as well as the risk that payments may be delayed 
- see infra note 55) and may counter-offer with 900,000 dollars as a proposed 
purchase price. If the originator believes that future payments will be made 
without losses, it may well regard 900,000 dollars as too low a price because 
the SPV would become the owner of the entire payment stream, including all 
collections above 900,000 dollars. 
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tors in the capital markets based on the combined pool of fu-
ture payments. Because each originator's sale would stand on 
its own, the complexities of a joint venture are avoided. The 
costs of underwriting and selling the SPV's securities thereby 
can be made economically viable. 
2. Example of a True Sale of a Divisible Interest 
It may be useful to illustrate a sale of a divisible interest in 
a future payment stream. In considering how to structure the 
following example, an attempt has been made to balance, in a 
manner that will be consistent both with a true sale and com-
mercial acceptability, the SPV's desire to minimize the collec-
tion risk associated with each purchase and the originator's 
competing desire that the interest in the payment streams sold 
does not give the SPV a windfall. 
The example chosen is a structured financing for a company 
that originates payment streams in the form of receivables ow-
ing from third parties for goods sold and services rendered,44 
and from time to time sells divisible interests in these receiv-
ables to an SPV. The question is whether the transfer of these 
divisible interests can be structured as a true sale. 
Assume for a given batch of receivables in which an interest 
is to be sold that the net outstanding balance at the time of 
sale is $1,000,000. Also assume that the SPV agrees to buy a 
divisible interest in the receivables, measured as follows, for a 
purchase price of $700,000:45 
44 Virtually any type of originator could have been used as an example. For 
example, the originator could be a hospital that originates payment streams in 
the form of receivables for healthcare services rendered (owing from patients 
and related governmental and private insurers). 
45 The purchase prIce of $700,000 used in the example could well have been 
$600,000, or $900,000, or even $500,000. It and the trigger point are arms' 
length negotiated numbers. If, for example, the purchase price were negotiated 
to be $500,000, the trigger point might be expected to be negotiated in the 
order of magnitude of $515,000. The lower the purchase price compared to the 
amount of the future payment stream, the less is the SPV's risk of collections 
not reaching the trigger point. While theoretically any negotiated purchase price 
and trigger point would be consistent with a true sale for the reasons discussed 
in the text accompanying notes 48-49, at some point the purchase price may be 
so low compared to the amount of the payment stream that it would violate the 
"smell test" and be considered a secured loan rather than a true sale. 
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(i) 100 percent of all collections up to a "bigger point," and 
(il) a fixed percentage of all collections above the trigger 
point. 
The trigger point and the fixed percentage would be negotiat-
ed at the time of the purchase, and thereafter would remain 
fixed. In negotiating' the trigger point, the SPV will want to 
select a number that reflects its best estimate of the minimum 
collections that will ensure repayment of its purchase price and 
a desirable return on the investment represented by its pur-
chase price. The originator, by contrast, will want the trigger 
point to be as low as possible. In negotiating the fixed percent-
age, the SPV will want a number that provides an extra source 
of compensation for taking a risk on fixing the amount of the 
trigger point and the collection risk.46 The originator, again, 
will prefer the percentage to be as low as possible. 
Assume that the negotiated trigger point was $720,000 and 
the negotiated fixed percentage was three percent. Further as-
sume that the collections on the receivables later tum out to be 
$980,000.47 One then would compute the following numbers: 
~8 The divisible interest equally well could have been structured without a 
fixed percentage. The SPV, in that case, only buys an interest in the receivables 
measured by 100% of all collections up to the trigger point. 
47 Collections on each batch of receivables sold would be separately tracked. 
From the standpoint of a true sale, each transfer of a divisible interest in a 
batch would be independent of each other such transfer. This sometimes is 
referred to as the transfers not being "cross-collateralized." Nonetheless, to the 
extent the originator makes limited representations and warranties consistent 
with a true sale, see supra note 26 and accompanying text, there is no logical 
reason why the originator could not cross-collateralize an indemnification obliga-
tion for breach of such representations and warranties by pledging all of its 
assets, which would include the originator's retained interest in each batch of 
receivables. For example, in a securitization of a middle-market company that, 
perhaps, might not have completely reliable records as to its future payment 
streams, the SPV could be indemnified for reliance on inaccurate records, and 
this indemnity could (if desirable) be secured by all of the company's assets. 










= $980,000 - $720,000. 
= $260,000. 
= 3% x $260,000 
= $7,800. 
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Therefore, for a purchase price of $700,000, the SPV would re-
ceive a return of $727,800. 
Applying the factors discussed above, the transfer of the di-
visible interest in this illustration constitutes a true sale under 
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. The SPV has assumed the 
benefits and burdens of ownership of the divisible interest it 
has purchased. If the amount of the divisible interest, calculat-
ed by applying the negotiated trigger point and fixed percent-
age to actual collections, is insufficient to repay the SPV's pur-
chase price plus its applicable cost of capital, the SPV suffers a 
loss. The SPV, however, will benefit to the extent that collec-
tions received exceed its investment and cost of funds.48 The 
pricing formula is, effectively, a discount and has no semblance 
of loan-type pricing. Also, because the trigger point and the 
fixed percentage are negotiated prior to each sale of a divisible 
interest, there is no retroactive adjustment of the purchase 
price based on the amount of actual collections or the timing of 
collections.49 
.8 The SPV will receive the amount, if any, by which the trigger point is in 
excess of its purchase price and return on investment. The SPV also will re-
ceive its negotiated fixed percentage of all collections above the trigger point, 
although a transaction structured without entitling the SPV to collections above 
the trigger point would still have enough potential benefit to constitute a true 
sale. See infra note 55 . 
• 9 The foregoing example might be contrasted "with an approach, sometimes 
seen, of the originator selling the entire payment stream to a buyer in return 
for which the buyer pays its purchase price partly in cash and partly by giving 
the originator an undivided interest (or "participation") in future collections of 
the payment stream. At least where the buyer is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
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Consequently, the only true sale issue that can be raised in 
the foregoing transaction is whether, because the SPY is receiv-
ing 100 percent of the first dollars collected up to the trigger 
point, there may be excessive recourse. This is not, however, 
the type of recourse that is inconsistent with a true sale. The 
nature of the recourse in this transaction is such that the legal 
rights and economic consequences are those of a true sale and 
not a secured loan. 
The type of transaction that is inconsistent with a true sale 
occurs where the SPV's recourse against the originator (or its 
assets) is subject to adjustment to ensure that the SPY receives 
its original investment plus an agreed upon return on the in-
vestment.50 The originator then would receive all collections in 
excess of the foregoing amounts.51 Recourse of this nature will 
be referred to as "adjustable recourse." 
Adjustable recourse is inconsistent with a sale because the 
adjustment changes the benefits and burdens of a sale to those 
of a secured loan. The benefits and burdens of a sale are that 
the buyer enjoys the benefit of any increase in value of the 
asset purchased and bears the burden of any loss in value.52 
The benefits and burdens of a secured loan are that the lender 
is entitled only to repayment of the amount of its loan plus 
interest at an agreed upon rate; and the borrower is entitled, 
as a matter of law,53 to the return of any remaining collateral. 
the originator in a FINCO structure, this raises an issue whether the originator 
is truly entering into an arms' length negotiated sale. To achieve a sale, the 
probability that the originator will be repaid on its participation must be suffi-
ciently high to induce an independent seller of the payment stream in an arms' 
length market transaction to take the participation as partial payment. 
60 In Major's Furniture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 546 (3d 
Cir. 1979), the purported purchaser of the receivables. unilaterally changed the 
discount from time to time to reflect the prime rate. Due to such changes, cou-
pled with full recourse against Major's, the court held that transaction to be a 
secured loan. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
61 Compare U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (secured party's right to dispose of collateral 
after default) ("If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured 
party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless agreed, the 
debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale 
of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for 
any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides."). 
62 Rexnord, Inc. v. U.S., 940 F.2d 1094, 1098 (7th Cir. 1991). 
63 See supra note 51. 
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Even if the SPV in this example were virtually assured of 
receiving collections up to the trigger point (because it receives 
100 percent of the first dollars collected),54 its benefits and 
burdens are still those of a buyer. The SPV takes the risk that 
collections may be slower than originally anticipated and the 
trigger point therefore may be too low to give the SPV a satis-
factory return on its investment, as well as the risk that collec-
tions are insufficient even to reach the trigger point. But be-
cause the SPV is entitled to receive all collections up to the 
trigger point (and is not limited to an agreed upon rate of re-
turn), if the actual rate of collection turns out to be higher 
than originally anticipated the SPV will benefit from a greater 
return on its investment.55 It is this potential for both gain 
and loss on its investment, due to the fixed nature of the divisi-
ble interest, that makes the SPV's recourse consistent with a 
54 A13 previously discussed, however, the trigger point would be fixed by 
negotiation between the SPV and the originator prior to the sale of the divisible 
interest. A rational originator would not be expected under ordinary circum-
stances to agree to too high a trigger point because the SPV benefits from all 
collections up to the trigger point. 
55 A numerical example perhaps would be helpful. If the $720,000 trigger 
point in the example discussed in the text accompanying notes 45-48 is collected 
in an average of six months, the SPV's effective rate of return, assuming simple 
interest, on its $700,000 investment would be: 
$20.000 6/12 = 5.7%. 
$700,000 
If, however, the $720,000 trigger point were collected in an average of two 
months, the SPV's effective rate of return would be 
$20.000 2112 = 17.1%. 
$700,000 
On the other hand, if the originator becomes troubled and collections are 
delayed to an average of, say, nine months, the SPV's effective rate of return 
would be as little as 
$20.000 9/12 = 3.8%. 
$700,000 
The SPV therefore is subject to significant variation of its return on invest-
ment. Because a significant disparity between the anticipated and the actual 
collection rate can significantly affect the economics of the transaction, the sale 
of a divisible interest would appear to have its greatest practical application to 
short term payment streams, such as trade receivables, retail credit card receiv-
ables and the like, where the collection rate can be predicted with greater ac-
curacy. Certain items relating to the unique characteristics of the payment 
stream, such as dilution, may (in appropriate cases) be able to be covered by a 
specific indemnity without impairing true sale treatment. Cf. notes 26 and 47, 
supra. 
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true sale.56 
C. After a True Sale, Could the SPV's Divisible Interest in 
Commingled Cash Collections be Impaired? 
Two theories threaten to impair an SPV's divisible interest in 
cash collections that have been commingled with cash collec-
tions of the originator's retained interest in the future payment 
stream. The first theory is that, in the event of the originator's 
bankruptcy, cash collections of the divisible interest would con-
stitute "cash collateral" and therefore be subject to Section 363 
of the Bankruptcy Code.57 The second theory is that to the 
extent cash collections are commingled with the originator's 
interest in the same payment stream, Section 9-306 of the 
U.C.C. limits the SPV's interest in the collections.58 Neither 
theory should apply to cash collections of a divisible interest. 
56 A similar analysis is used to determine the statU8 of a production pay-
ment in the oil and gas and mineral industries. A production payment is the 
right to share (normally a specified percentage) minerals produced from de-
scribed property, free of the costs of production and terminating when a speci-
fied quantity or dollar amount has been realized. See Alamo Nat'! Bank of San 
Antonio v. Hurd, 485 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); see also 2 HOWARD R. 
WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, On. AND GAS LAw § 422 (1992). If the owner 
of the property on which the oil, gas or minerals are located mes for bank-
ruptcy, it becomes important to characterize the interest held by the recipient of 
the production payment in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
As in the sale of a divisible interest, a production payment "imposes no 
personal obligation to pay the sum of money specified in the instrument creat-
ing it and no duty to deliver the agreed number of units of production apart 
from actual production from the described premises." Id. § 422.2 at 373. The 
right to receive payment does not arise until the oil, gas or minerals are pro-
duced. Id. The recipient of the production payment therefore has assumed all 
the risks and benefits of ownership. "If, however, the payment is required to be 
made whether or not the production is obtained or is sufficient for the purpose, 
there is no true [production] payment; instead there is a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship and a lien or other security interest in production" because there is no 
indicia of ownership. Id. § 422.2 at 374' (footnote omitted). 
67 11 U.S.C. § 363. 
56 For a detailed discussion of commingling under U.C.C. § 9-306, see 
SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 40-41. 
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1. Cash Collateral under Bankruptcy Law 
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code defines procedures for 
allocating cash and cash equivalents in which both the debtor 
(i.e., the originator) and a third party (i.e., the SPV) share an 
interest. If cash collections of a divisible interest constitute 
"cash collateral," the procedures of Section 363 would have to 
be followed in allocating the collections. These procedures, if 
applicable, could hinder the SPV's distribution of cash collec-
tions to its security holders.59 
Cash collateral is defined as 
cash, .. , deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents ... in 
which the [debtor's] estate and an entity other than the [debtor's] 
estate have an interest and includes the proceeds, products, off-
spring, rents, or profits of property subject to a security interest 
as provided in section 552(b) of [the Bankruptcy Code], whether 
existing before or after the commencement of a [bankruptcy] 
case.so 
Cash collateral therefore would include cash collections of prop-
erty owned by a debtor in which a third party has a security 
interest. The debtor's ownership interest and the third party's 
security interest constitute overlapping and competing interests 
in the same property.S1 
Does the term "cash collateral" also include cash collections 
of a divisible interest in a payment stream sold to an SPV? 
Resolution of this question turns on whether an originator, in 
bankruptcy, and an SPV both "have an interesf' in these collec-
tions. The following analysis will consider, first, the divisible 
interest to the extent it constitutes an interest in 100 percent 
L9 Even if collections of the divisible interest are required to be paid to the 
SPY, a delay might result in the investors in the SPY's securities not being 
paid principal or interest on a timely basis, which could impair the investment 
grade rating of the securities. 
60 11 U.S.C. § 363(a). 
61 Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code prevents the debtor from using cash 
collections without affording the third party a court hearing at which the third 
party's security interest would be adequately protected. "Adequate protection," 
however, may be inadequate from the standpoint of the third party to the 
extent non-cash collateral is substituted for cash and cash equivalents. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 363(c)(2), 363(e), 361. 
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of collections of the future payment stream up to the trigger 
point; and, second, the divisible interest to the extent it consti-
tutes a fractional undivided interest (represented by the fixed 
percentage) in collections above the trigger point. 
The sale of the divisible interest to the SPV has been shown 
to be a true sale under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.62 
The originator therefore cannot have an ownership interest in 
cash collections of the divisible interest up to the trigger point 
because the SPV owns 100 percent of such collections (and the 
SPV has not granted to the originator a security interest or any 
other type of interest in the collections). Because the originator 
has no interest in these collections, the term "cash collateral" 
should not include cash collections of a divisible interest up to 
the trigger point. Accordingly, such collections should not be 
subject to the procedures set forth in Section 363 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 
The analysis of whether the term "cash collateral" includes 
cash collections of a divisible interest above the trigger point is 
more complicated because both the originator and the SPV own 
a fractional undivided interest in the collections. If, for exam-
ple, the SPV's fixed percentage is three percent and the amount 
of collections above the trigger point is $260,000, the SPV 
would be entitled to $7,800, and the originator would be enti-
tled to $252,200. Even though the SPV's interest is an owner-
ship and not a security interest, the definition of "cash collater-
al" refers to "an interest»63 and therefore could be interpreted 
broadly to include both types of interests. 
If the SPV's ~wnership interest in collections above the trig-
ger point did constitute "cash collateral" under Section 363(a), a 
court nonetheless should be required to allocate cash collections 
to the SPV and not permit the originator to use the cash.64 
Subsections 363(h) and G) contemplate a debto~ and a third 
party having co-ownership undivided interests in property rep-
resented by a tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by 
the entirety.65 The debtor is permitted, in these limited cir-
cumstances,56 to sell the third party's co-ownership interest, 
62 See supra notes 44 to 56 and accompanying text. 
63 See supra text accompanying note 60. 
64 Cf. supra note 61 (regarding a debtor's right to use cash collateral by 
providing "adequate protection"). 
65 11 U.S.C. § 363(h). 
66 Because courts have wanted to limit the right of debtors to sell co-owner-
No. 2:139] SECURITIZATION OF DIVISIBLE INTERESTS 163 
but "the proceeds of such sale" are required to be "distribute[d] 
to the . . . co-owners of such property . . . and to the [debtor] 
. . . according to the interests of such . . . co-owners and of the 
[debtor].n67 Therefore, when a co-ownership interest is reduced 
to cash, there appears to be a legislative intent to distribute 
the cash to the co-owners (i.e., the SPV and the originator) 
according to their respective interests.68 
It is also possible that a divisible interest itself may consti-
tute a tenancy in common under state law. A tenancy in com-
mon can exist in relation to every type of property, including 
personal property such as a future payment stream.69 The 
originator need not intend the sale of the divisible interest to 
constitute a tenancy in common; the sale of an interest that is 
undivided, in and of itself, may create the tenancy in com-
mon.70 If the divisible interest were to constitute a tenancy in 
common under state law, Section 363(j) explicitly would require 
the cash collections of the divisible interest to be distributed to 
the originator and the SPV according to their respective inter-
ests.71 
2. Commingling under Commercial Law 
If the originator goes bankrupt when cash collections of the 
divisible interest and the originator's retained interest are com-
mingled, could Section 9-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
limit the SPV's perfected interest in these collections? Where an 
originator sells a divisible interest in a future payment stream 
ship interests held by third parties, they have construed § 363(h) narrowly. See, 
e.g., In re Livingston, 804 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1986). 
67 11 U.S.C. § 363(j). 
68 Because even a delay in the distribution of collections could impair the 
investment grade rating on the SPY's securities (see supra note 59), a party 
seeking to avoid any risk of delay could structure the transaction so that the 
cash cQIlections up to the trigger point are sufficient to pay the SPY's securities 
or simply eliminate the SPY's right to a fixed percentage of collections above 
the trigger point. 
69 See, e.g., Kellum v. Williams, 39 So.2d 573 (Ala. 1949); 20 AM. JUR. 2D 
Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 25 (1965). 
70 See, e.g., Dressler v. Mulhern, 136 N.Y.S. 1049 (1912); Lutz v. Dutmer, 
282 N.W. 431 (Mich. 1938); Green v. Cannady, 57 S.E. 832 (S.C. 1907); 20 AM. 
JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 28 (1965). 
71 See supra text accompanying notes 65-68. 
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to an SPY, commingling could result either from the origina-
tor's interest in collections above the trigger point being depos-
ited into a deposit account containing collections of the divisible 
interest, or from the originator's and the SPV's respective inter-
ests in collections above the trigger point being deposited into 
the same deposit account. For the reasons set forth below, Sec-
tion 9-306 should be interpreted not to apply to commingled 
cash collections of a divisible interest. 
Section 9-306 of the U.C.C. governs a secured party's rights 
on disposition of collateral. A central concept in Section 9-306 is 
"proceeds" which is defined as "whatever is received upon the 
... collection ... of collateral.,,72 Cash collections of a divisi-
ble interest therefore may constitute proceeds. The general rule 
of Section 9-306 is that "a security interest continues in collat-
eral . . . and also continues in any identifiable proceeds includ-
ing collections" that are received by the originator instead of' 
the SPV.73 However, in the event of an "insolvency proceed-
ing," such as a bankruptcy,74 a more restrictive rule applies 
under Section 9-306(4). The SPV's divisible interest in cash 
collections of the future payment stream would continue only in 
specified categories of proceeds.75 
Upon an originator's bankruptcy, an SPV's d,ivisible interest 
in cash collections continues to the extent such collections are 
deposited to a bank account of the originator containing only 
collections of the divisible interest.76 Likewise, an SPV's divisi-
ble interest in cash collections continues to the extent such 
collections are deposited into a deposit account owned mid con-
trolled by the SPY and not by the originator.77 
72 U.C.C. § 9-306(1). The term "collateral" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c) 
to include "accounts and chattel paper which have been sold." Therefore, pro-
ceeds would appear to include collections of a divisible interest in a future 
payment stream consisting of "accounts" or "chattel paper." See id. § 9·106 and 
§ 9-105(1)(b». Cf. supra note 11. 
13 U.C.C. § 9-306(2). The term "security interest" used therein includes "any 
interest of a buyer of accounts and chattel paper which is subject to Article 9." 
U.C.C. § 1-201(37). Cf. id. 
74 U.C.C. § 1-201(22). 
75 Id. § 9-306(4). 
76 Id. § 9-306(4)(a). 
77 Id. § 9-105(1)(e) ("deposit account"). The commingling rule of U.C.C. § 9· 
306(4) is intended to account for "proceeds received by a debtor." Id. § 9-306, 
Official Comment No. 1. Collections received in the SPV's deposit account are 
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Analysis becomes more difficult, however, if collections of the 
SPV's divisible interest are deposited into an originator's bank 
account containing funds of the originator. In that case, Section 
9-306(4), by its terms, suggests that the SPV's interest would 
be limited to an amount determined by a formula. Under this 
formula, an SPV's divisible interest in commingled cash collec-
tions is limited to collections received by the originator within 
10 days before the bankruptcy case is instituted less the sum. of 
payments made to the SPY on account of such collections. The 
Spy would lose its interest in cash collections received by the 
originator prior to such 10-day-period and not paid over to the 
SPY before the originator's bankruptcy.78 
Where cash collections of the SPV's divisible interest in a 
payment stream are commingled with general funds of the orig-
inator, the limitation in Section 9-306(4) would apply. Howev~r, 
where cash collections of the SPV's divisible interest in a pay-
ment stream are commingled only with cash collections of the 
originator's interest in the same payment stream, the limitation 
in Section 9-306(4) should not apply.79 
The purpose of the formula in Section 9-306(4) is to "substi-
tute specific rules of identification for general principles of trac-
ing" in situations where "proceeds have been commingled with 
other funds."ao Would collections from the originator's retained 
not proceeds received by the debtor. Therefore a practical solution to the com-
mingling issue is to cause all collections of the future payment stream to be 
deposited directly into the SPV's deposit account. 
78 Therefore another practical solution would be to "sweep" collections at 
least every 10 days from the originator to the SPV or to require all collections 
to be deposited to an account of the SPV (instead of the originator's account). 
An additional practical solution to the commingling issue can be referred to as 
the "bootstrap approach." In note 47, supra, it was suggested that the originator 
could cross-collateralize its indemnification obligations by pledging other assets, 
perhaps including the originator's retained interest in the future payment 
stream. Such cross-collateralization would give the SPV a security interest in 
the originator's retained interest, thereby preventing commingling under U.C.C. 
§ 9-306(4). See infra text accompanying notes 80-82. 
79 Such commingling may occur, for example, where the trigger point has 
been reached and each additional dollar of collections is allocated to the SPV 
according to its negotiated fixed percentage and to the originator according to 
its retained interest. 
80 See U.C.C. § 9-306, Official Comment No. 2(a), and U.C.C. § 9-306(4Xd) 
(emphasis added). To the extent that the U.C.C. does not apply to the sale 
because the payment stream sold is neither accounts nor chattel paper (supra 
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interest in a payment stream in which the SPY has a divisible 
interest constitute "other funds," or would they constitute pro-
ceeds? As discussed above, the term proceeds includes whatever 
is received upon the collection of collateral. The term "collater-
al" means "the property subject to a security interest."81 Be-
cause a divisible interest creates an undivided interest in the 
entire future payment stream, all of the cash collections of the 
future payment stream should constitute proceeds. Accordingly, 
cash collections of an SPV's divisible interest in a payment 
stream that are commingled with cash collections of the origi-
nator's interest in the same payment stream are not commin-
gled "with other funds" within the meaning of U.C.C. Section 9-
306(4).82 
It also should be noted that the risk of commingling dis-
cussed above applies only to cash collections of the divisible 
interest that are commingled with the originator's funds at the 
time the originator first becomes subject to a bankruptcy case. 
Cash collections received by the originator thereafter are not 
subject to U.C.C. Section 9-306(4), which by its terms provides 
that an interest continues in "identifiable cash proceeds in the 
form of money which is neither commingled with other money 
nor deposited in a deposit account prior to" an originator's 
bankruptcy,83 and also continues in "identifiable cash proceeds 
in the form of checks and the like which are not deposited in a 
deposit account prior to" such bankruptcy.84 
note 72), the common law general principles of tracing would appear to apply in 
lieu of the formula in U.C.C. § 9-306(4). In addition, the Article 9 Study Com-
mittee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code 
recently recommended to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and the American Law Institute that subsection (4) of U.C.C. § 9-
306, including the formula and other special rules that apply to proceeds only 
in the event of a debtor's insolvency proceedings, should be eliminated. Perma-
nent Editorial Board Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Report, 
Vol. 1, part III.C.15, at 122 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
81 U.C.C. § 9-105(IXc) (including "accounts and chattel paper which have 
been sold."). 
82 If, of course, such collections are commingled with general funds of the 
originator, that would raise a separate commingling concern under U.C.C. § 9-
306(4). In that case, the "bootstrap approach" discussed in supra note 78 could 
be used. 
83 U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(b) (emphasis added). 
84 Id. § 9-306(4Xc) (emphasis added); accord, In re Bumper Sales, Inc. 
(Unsee. Credo Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp.), 20 B.C.D. 1212, 1216 (4th Cir. 
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ID. CONCLUSIONS 
The sale of a divisible interest in a· future payment stream 
can be structured in an economically viable manner as a true 
sale. After the sale, the SPV's divisible interest in commingled 
cash collections would not be impaired under bankruptcy or 
commercial law. 
Selling a divisible interest in a future payment stream can 
revolutionize the development of structured finance and asset 
securitization as means of raising capital. Not only will it allow 
for a less cumbersome transactional structure than that which 
is currently used, but the reduced transaction costs as well as 
the economies of scale that can be achieved by multiple origina-
tors joining together in a single securitization transaction prom-
ise to expand the capital markets to now-excluded middle-mar-
ket companies.85 
1990). 
85 To the extent small businesses and hospitals generate future payment 
streams, they could benefit like rirlddle-market companies. Application of struc-
tured finance to the small business sector of the economy is an important 
governmental policy goal. See SEC Release, supra note I, at 4. 

